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Journal of Contemporary Macroeconomic Issues

  • Online ISSN 2709-0469
  • Print ISSN 2708-4973
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  • Open Access Article

    12 Pages Download PDF: Does Democracy Come at a Fiscal Cost? Revisiting the Political Business Cycles in Pakistan

    Does Democracy Come at a Fiscal Cost? Revisiting the Political Business Cycles in Pakistan

    Niaz Ali, Muhammad Tariq, Muhammad Azam Khan

    2025-12-02 https://doi.org/10.36923/jcmi.v6i2.663

    The role of electoral incentives on public spending patterns is particularly relevant in developing nations such as Pakistan as it has direct bearing on the issue of fiscal discipline and quality of governance. This study examines the role of electoral cycles on sectoral budgetary allocations at provincial level in Pakistan. Based on panel data of four provinces covering the years 1972-2018, the study uses a Fixed Effects (FE) model to determine dynamic variations in budgetary patterns. These findings are quite solid in favor of the Political Business Cycle (PBC) hypothesis with the results showing that government spending rises by a large margin (23 percentage points of GDP) in election years. It also shows that population development and openness to trade have impact of high magnitude that is positive when it comes to government expenditure, and unemployment level has no significant impact. The evidence shows a greater requirement of fiscal policies and institutional limits so as to put down opportunistic expenditure of the incumbent governments. Pakistan ought to think about institutionalizing long-term rules-based budgetary plans at provinces level to curb discretional expenditure during elections. Opportunistic fiscal expansions could be hindered by legal provisions making statutory budget ceilings obligatory before elections. Lastly, adopting practices of participatory budgeting on a local government level would increase citizen involvement and responsibility, which would minimize the room on fruitlessly spending money based on political interests

    pp. 18-29 Abstract views:217 Downloads:109
  • Open Access Article

    13 Pages Download PDF: Governance, Corruption and Income Inequality: A Panel Study of Selected Asian Countries

    Governance, Corruption and Income Inequality: A Panel Study of Selected Asian Countries

    Faisal Abbas, Rehmat Ullah Awan, Falak Sher

    2024-12-09 https://doi.org/10.36923/jcmi.v5i2.597

    This study investigated the relationship among governance, corruption, and income inequality in selected Asian countries over 2000-2021. Data for Governance (Political Governance and Institutional Governance) were taken from the World Governance Indicators (WGI). Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used to create the governance index using four indicators of WGI: Political stability; no violence and voice & accountability; Rule of law; and Control of corruption. Data on income inequality (Gini index) were collected from the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP). Data on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as a proxy for corruption were taken from Transparency International. Fully Modified and Dynamic OLS (FMOLS) and DOLS were used for dynamic analysis. The study explored the inverse connection between governance and income inequality, as well as the positive impact of corruption on income inequality. The study suggested that the country should improve the quality of governance, as it leads to the improvement of institutions. Improved institutions and a politically stable country can reduce corruption and income inequality. Finally, policymakers should establish governance-improvement policies to tackle corruption and income inequality.

    pp. 53-65 Abstract views:279 Downloads:98
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Journal of Contemporary Macroeconomic Issues · Online ISSN 2709-0469 · Print ISSN 2708-4973 · Published by ICR Publications · Contact editorial office

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